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BEIWEEN THE SP:OCIES

In mainstream, Western moral philosofhy,
animals have passed through one stage, are
=rently in a seoond, and, if the anirnal
liberation movement is successful, will be
entering a third.
In the first of these
stages, anirrals were excluded fran being
direct objects of moral concern at all.
In
the second stage, anirrals have becane objects
of compassion and of the ~ral concerns that
cluster about compassion.
However, they
remain resources to be exploited for human
benefit.
In the third stage, anim3.ls will
become objects of our concern with fairness
and the moral concepts which cluster about
the idea of justice. I want to go over these
stages with you, indicating how they origi
nated and developed and detailing the differ
ences am::mg them.

Stage I:

Genesis, made us His vice-regent on earth~ He
has put us here to rule and administer what
He has created and called "good."
You'd
think that a subordinate given this awesome
responsibility by the all-powerful Creator of
the Universe would want to be very careful
that he/she did nothing to hann or detract
from God's province.
Uhfortunately--for the animals--that is
not the way this Biblical metafhor has been
developed.
While the relation between God
and His special children, i.e., humans, was
interpreted using the nodel of the loving
parent, the relation between us and the rest
of creation was interpreted using the nodel
of the medieval, feudal despot.
Christian
theologians interpreted the granting of "do
minion II not as a solenn responsibility to
care for what God has created but as a li
cense entitling us to treat nature as our
danain, as having been created for our bene
fit, as a resource to use as we see fit to
satisfy our needs and desires.
As a result,
the idea that humans might owe respect to or
oonsideration for anirnals became as unthink
able in Christian moral tradition as the idea
that a feudal king was obligated to respect
his serfs.

Natural Resources

The classical concepts of anirrals which
have contributed to Western moral tradition
can be divided into those emanating fran the
Biblical book of Genesis and those emanating
from the Greek philosofher Aristotle. While
Greek philosofhy and Biblical teaching differ
in many and significant ways, they share two
ideas which have been crucial in shaping our
traditional attitudes toward animals.
The
first of these is the belief that nature is
ordered hierarchically, with human beings, or
at least sane human beings, at the apex of
creation.
The second of these shared ideas
is the belief that purpose is a fundamental
category in nature, with the lower orders of
nature having been created for the purpose of
fulfilling the needs of the higher orders.

In the centuries following the death of
Christ, Christian theologians turned to Greek
fhilosofhy in order to interpret Christianity
in a way which would make sense to the intel
lectual coomunity of Europe.
Especially in
the later Middle Ages, it was the philosofhy
of Aristotle that was thus employed. Aristo

tle declared that all things were governed
and understood by four factors: the material
of which they were made, their form or organ
izing structure, their maker, and their pur
pose. Applying this approach to the study of
nature gave rise to the famous dictum that
"Nature does nothing in vain," that is, that
everything in nature serves a purpose.
In
deed, Aristotle organized all of nature-
which, unlike the Christian view, included
humans,
i.e., "rational animals"--into a
hierarchical order in which the lower orders
were there for the purpose of serving the
higher orders. Aristotle's hierarchy was one
of complexity, with the least complicated
things at the bottom, e.g., mud and rocks,
and the most complicated, viz., intelligent
Greek men, at the top. Aristotle's" scienti
fic" ordering of nature thus reinforced the
Christian belief that all of nature existed
to serve human ends and left animals still

the story of creation contained in
the first chapter of Genesis, it is said
that people were created in the "image" of
God and that we were given "dominion" over
the rest of creation.
Being the sole image
of God in creation provides us a unique sta
tus in the universe, and being entrusted with
dominion over God's creation is recognition
of this special position.
One might expect
that the anirrals would have benefitted hand
somely from these metafhors.
After all, God
is supposed to be a loving parent, who is
solicitous of the well-being of those He has
created.
If humans are the image of God,
then they, too, should be concerned to love
and cherish, aid and protect what God has
created.
Furthenrore, God has, according to
In
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were just the results of undirected, causal
forces, with the chain of causes stretching
back ad infinitum.

or

The best that the animals could do under
this regime was enter the arena of rroral
concern under two indirect headings.
First,
under the standard moral and legal statutes
concerning property, animals who were owned
were protected against being harmed by anyone
but their owners.
Even some wild animals
attained some protection in this way, since
they were considered the property of the
king, duke, or other local royalty. Second,
all animals enjoyed the protection of being
occasions for moral education.
One of the
most popular arguments for the humane treat
ment of animals was put forward by st. Thcma.s
Aquinas in the thirteenth century. According
to Thcma.s, we could not have any moral obli
gations directly to animals, since they lack
souls; nevertheless, we should be considerate
of the needs of animals and not be indiffer
ent to their suffering, because if we get in
the habit of being insensitive to them, we
may very well become insensitive to the needs
and feelings of our fellow humans, which
would be a morally pernicious development.
Thus, although the animals were denied the
full fruit of moral concern by the Christian
Aristotlean view of the world as a hierarchi
cal, purposive, feudal order, animals were
able to gather a few crumbs of respect and
compassion as property and teaching devices.

Since the concept of purpose had proven
so unfortunate for the animals, we might
expect that its demise would mark the begin
ning of a golden age for the animals, but,
unhappily, that is not the case.
The new
science contended that except for the human
mind-and perhaps not even with that excep
tion--everything could be understood as a
complex of machinery, nothing but gears,
levers, nuts, and bolts.
When applied to
animals, this world metaphor led to the con
clusion, made farrous by the seventeenth cen
tury, French philosopher and matherratician,
Rene Descartes, that animals, like clocks,
could feel neither pleasure nor pain.
They
were merely "autcma.ta," said Descartes, God's
ingenious robots.
This conclusion rerroved
animals even farther from the realm of rroral
concern than they had been under Aristotlean
rule, since the function of morality is pre
cisely to protect and further the interests
of those capable of feeling pleasure and
pain.
It is surely not an accident that the
practice of vivisecting anirnals--nailing them
to boards and then disecting them while still
alive--was begun by the followers of Des
cartes at Port Royal.
Reaction against vivisection immediately
followed its inception.
The French philoso
phers Montaigne and Voltaire were parti
cularly strident in rejecting the idea that
animals were merely unfeeling machines who
could be disected with as little moral con
cern as one might have in taking apart a
clock.
Nonetheless, the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, intellectually domi
nated by the spectacular successes of the
physical sciences, very likely represent the
low point for animals in mainstream, Western
philosophy.
However, in good dialectical
fashion, it is from this moral desert that
the fortunes of the animals will arise and
progress in the nineteenth century.

It is worth noting that Aristotle did
not confine his purposive, hierarchical or
dering of things to inter-species relations.
He extended it, logically enough,
into our
intra-species relations, contending that the
less intelligent races were intended to be
slaves for the more intelligent--the Greeks
being the most intelligent, of course.
He
also claimed that, for the same reason, women
were intended to serve men.
These claims
again merely reinforced the sexism, anti
semitism, and racism which have long infected
Christianity, and did so emphatically during
the Middle Ages.
However, it was not these
moral prejudices which led to the fall of the
Christian-Aristotlean worldview in the early
modern era.
Rather, it was the rejection by
modern scientists of the category of purpose
in understanding nature. People like Newton,
Galileo, and the other pioneers of modern
science were able to devise ways of under
standing and manipulating nature which did
not involve presuming that anything in nature
\vas created for a purpose.
Rather, things

Stage II: , "Be Kind to Animals"

western moral thinking has been divided,
roughly, into reflections about two families
of ideas.
The first of these we may call
"the kindness family."
It includes such
ideas as 1Y>Jlevolence, compassion, sympathy,
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charity, happiness, welfare, and friendship.
Moral philosophies which focus on this family
of ideas tend to express IOOral concern in
tenns of seeking the good life, being altru
istic or saintly, being a good friend or
neighbor, pursuing the general welfare, and
making the world a happier place in which to
live.
The rroral philosophies of ancient
Greece and nineteenth century Britain
pro
vide examples of such
kindness-daninated
rrorality. The other family of rroral ideas we
may call "the fairness family." It includes
such ideas as justice, obligation, resp:msi
bility, rights, honesty, integrity, and com
mandments. Moral PJ.ilosoPJ.ies which focus on
this family of ideas tend to express rroral
concern in tenns of adhering to rroral can
mandments and laws, doing one's duty, fulfil
ling one's pranises and other resp:msibili
ties, seeing that justice is done, and main
taining a clear conscience.
The Old Testa
ment and Puritanism provide examples of such
fairness-daninated rroralities.
It follows
that to enter the arena of moral concern in
our culture is to be covered by at least' one
of these two families of rroral concepts.
In the nineteenth century,

the propriety of using animals for human
transportation, food, clothing, or even in
science--although this is also the era in
which the first anti-vivisection societies
are fonned.
However, the feudal view that
those in power need not concern themselves
with the needs and feelings of their inferi
0rs is now displaced by the idea that we
ought to be compassionate rulers who spare
the animals we use and sacrifice any pain or
suffering not necessary for that use or sac
rifice. '!'he =del of the medieval despot has
been replaced with that of the good shePJ.erd
who tends his/her flock not only for his/her
benefit but also for theirs.
The idea of being kind to animals has
grown and spread over the last century and a
half lIDtil it now seems safe to say that it
is the dominant idea in contemporary, Western
IOOral thinking about animals.
Victorian
rroralists touted humane concern for animals
as one of the marks of a civilized society,
and the first humane laws to protect dray
animals have been developed into expansive
codes prohibiting cruelty to animals and
myriad public and private agencies devoted to
protecting animals fran abuse, protecting
endangered species, rescuing animals in dis
tress, and otherwise helping to relieve their
suffering and ameliorate their condition. We
spend a considerable arrolIDt of time, IOOney,
and energy caring for animals today, and we
can be justifiably proud of living in an
animal loving society.

animals fin

ally got their paws and hooves through the
door of kindness.
Although Cartesian scien
tists may have been able to convince them
selves that dogs screaming on the disecting
table were in the same category with clocks
whose gears gnashed and whined when out of
order, rrost people who came into contact with
animals were too wise, or simply too honest,
for that.
And remember that in this era,
when animals were still a primary source of
transportation and the cities were not so
insulated from the cOlIDtry, rrost people did
still come into frequent, daily contact with
animals.
Having been freed of the limita
tions of Christian dogma and the Aristotlean
hierarchy, and rebelling against the vestiges
of feudalism on many fronts, these people
were free to acknowledge that feeling compas
sion for and being directly rrorally concerned
about animals were neither heretical nor
irrational.
This breakthrough takes force
with the founding of the first S.P.C.A. 's and
other humane societies in nineteenth century
England and the passage of the first signifi
cant humane legislation in the same era and
locale.

Nevertheless,
animals remain on the
fringes of our IOOral concern today, not only
in the sense that cruelty to animals is con
sidered a minor crime but also in the sense
that animals remain, like poor relatives,
barely inside the door, with hat in hand,
hoping against hope for our charity.
For
while our culture is committed to being kind
to animals, that kindness has to compete with
others of our concerns, such as those for
abundant, inexpensive animal food products,
for the freedom to do what we please with our
property, and for the best possible chance of
having our ills cured and our lives extended.
In this competition,
our commitment to the
humane treatment of animals often runs a poor
second, third, fourth, or worse. For exam
ple, in order to spare fann animals the pain
and stress caused them by modern, intensive
farming techniques, we have not =dified
those techniques; rather, we cut the beaks
off tightly caged chickens to stop them fran

The idea that animals are available for
human service is, of course, not questioned
here.
The humane rrovement does not question
BE'IWEEN THE SPECIES
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pecking each other in frustration, and we
keep veal calves in dim light in the belief
that a drowsy calf is a contented calf. Like
other recipients of charity in our culture,
but even nvre so, animals do benefit directly
from our sympathy for their plight, but they
IlRlst make do with what is left over once our
other, nvre pressing concerns have been sa
tisf{ed.
Growing dissatisfaction--anvng hu
mans--with this situation has led to the
birth of "a new ethic for our treatment of
animals."

Stage III:

this is a vastly more massive injustice than
any humans have ever suffered.
Of course, nvst of our contemporaries
still do not see our use of animals as being
an injustice or as being covered by the fair
ness family of nvral ideas at all.
Although
none of them would, in other areas, accept
anything as long since discredited as Aristo
tlean science and feudalism, when it comes to
animals, they feel quite canfortable, thank
you,
with a hierarchical worldview that
places them at the top and only marginally
inhibits how they use their inferiors to
satisfy their desires.
In response to this
self-serving nvral camplacency, P'J,ilosoP'J,ers
such as Peter Singer, Bernard Rollin, myself,
and others have been emphasizing that just as
our basic moral concepts are color blind and
sex blind, so they are species blind.
For
example, there is nothing in the logic of the
Golden Rule to treat others as we would like
to be treated by them which restricts it to
people.
Similarly, the altruistic ideal of
setting aside selfish iqterests in order to
do that which will be best for all concerned
logically extends beyond the human family to
cover all. beings with interests.
Again,
pain, frustration, and boredom are evils
because of how they feel, not because of who
feels them; so, our moral commitment to mini
mizing the misery of this world logically
covers all those who can experience such
evils, not merely those sufferers who happen
to have HOllO sapien genes. And so forth.

Animal Liberation

During the past fifteen years, our hu
mane ethic has come under increasing, sharp
criticism.
"Kindness is not enough!" might
be a slogan for this new group qf animal
activists. In terms of the analytical frame
work we have been using here, what is now
being sought for animals is that they be
covered not only by the kindness family of
nvral ideas but also by the fairness family.
The situation today concerning animals is
analogous to that two hundred years ago con
cerning slaves.
While eighteenth century
society felt ccmfortable with requiring only
that slave owners treat their slaves compas
sionately, a small but growing group of peo
ple were demanding the abolition of slavery
altogether.
They contended that even if one
was kind to his/her slaves, slavery was still
an unjust institution in which the interests
of one group were routinely sacrificed to
fulfill the interests of another group.
The
slaves bore all the burdens, while the mas
ters reaped all the benefits of slave labor,
and that is the rankest sort of exploitation,
no matter how benign the masters were to
their slaves.
And that is the way things
remain with animals today.

Opponents of animal liberation often try
to portray it as a product of implausible
Eastern religions, such as that of the Jains,
or of mysterious, probably empty costruc
tions, such as "natural rights" and "inherent
value."
But that is simply not true.
The
liberating of animals from human exploitation
is merely the next logical step in the pro
gress of our everyday, Western nvral con
cepts.
Aristotle was the first major P'J,ilo
sOP'J,er to say that slavery was nvrally perni
cious--but his vision was ethnically and
sexually limited:
he objected only to the
enslaving of Greek men; the enslaving of
Persians and Egyptians and of wOOlen of all
races he considered natural. It has taken us
over two thousand years, and overcoming all
varieties of religious and racial, as well as
ethnic and sexual, prejudices to bring Aris
totle' s insight to its present, humanistic

Even where animal researchers adhere to
and even exceed. the requirements of the Ani
mal Welfare Act to insure that their animals
do not lack for veterinary care, anaesthesia,
and painless death, these animals are still
forced to live in cages, to suffer injuries,
to acquire diseases, and to die for causes
from which they will receive no benefit what
soever.
This is as intense an injustice as
any humans have ever suffered, and given the
magnitude of our exploitation of animals-
with several billion a year being raised and
killed annually in the United states alone-
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THE EYE OF THE

upon.
The deeper question, raised earlier,
is never even asked:
Is it ever rrorally
acceptable for some beings to benefit from

WHALE

the harms they cause to other beings?
Would biomedical and behavioral research
cane to a halt if the above question were
asked and the result were that animal experi
mentation ceased?
Probably not, but this is
much too large an issue to get into here.
However, suppose it did cease.
The human
. species would doubtless continue to exist,
just as it did before animal experimentation
began, with a d:iminished lifespan and quality
of life, to be sure. Yet other institutions,
fr01l1 which humans individually and collec
tively have benefited--for example slavery-
have bee!?- abandoned for rroral reasons.
And
many rrore should be, for similar reasons,
such as the oppression of women, children,
the elderly, and marginal peoples, and the
pursuit of "superiority" in nuclear weapons.
I am not arguing here that animal experimen
tation should be stopped, only pointing out
that the fact that stopping it would cause us
much inconvenience and even misery is not the
end of the matter.

(dedicated to Paul Watson and the Sea Shefilerd)

I looked into the eye of the whale
and saw the person looking back at me,
and she said to me,
"You are witness.
You cannot now turn away, II
Nor could I.
Cords of light-
cords of steel
bind me to her
for all time
and wherever I am
and wherever she is.
They are my burden
and my joy.

PAULETTE CALLEN
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SAPONTZIS

in rroral fililosofily that has already happened
in biology:
the evolution of our concept of
animals will merge with the evolution of our
concept of humanity, and we will cane to
recognize that together we all form one liv
ing, rrorally significant and worthy corrmunity
of interests on this planet.

ANIMALS.

Do they matter?
An exciting new awareness is
unfolding about our relationship
with animals and thE' rest of the
natural world. Read aonul it in
TIlE ANIMALS' AGENDA.
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